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Causes and Consequences of a Father’s Child Leave: 
Evidence from a Reform of Leave Schemes
*
 
Many OECD countries have implemented policies to induce couples to share parental leave. 
This paper investigates how responsive intra-household leave-sharing is to changes in 
economic incentives. To investigate this fundamental question, we are forced to look at one 
of the Nordic countries which are the most progressive when it comes to family-friendly 
policies. An extensive reform of child leave schemes in Denmark affected couples differently 
depending on whether the parents where employed in the same or in different parts of the 
public sector. Based on a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that economic incentives 
are very important for intra-household leave-sharing. Increasing the couples’ after tax income 
by $9 per day of leave which is transferred from the mother to the father is found to lead to a 
one day transfer. This corresponds to a supply elasticity close to unity. 
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1.  Introduction 
Policies to induce the fathers to use parental leave schemes have been introduced in many OECD 
countries  (e.g.  Austria,  Portugal,  Germany,  Denmark,  Finland,  Sweden,  Norway  and  Iceland). 
However, not much is known about the causes and consequences of increased leave-sharing. This paper 
contributes to filling this gap in the literature by investigating the causal impact of economic incentives 
on publicly employed fathers’ use of parental leave as well as the consequences of leave-sharing on the 
subsequent labor market career of the father and the mother. This is possible due to an extensive reform 
of  the  Danish  child  leave  schemes  in  2002  which  affected  publicly  employed  couples  differently 
depending on whether they where employed in the same or in different parts of the public sector (local 
vs. state). 
As regards fathers’ leave taking before this reform, Denmark was similar to e.g. the US; while 60% of 
Danish fathers used their right to take paid child leave in 2000 (average duration 3.5 weeks), 89% of 
US fathers took time off in relation to the births of their children (average duration 1.5. weeks)
1. In 
comparison,  82%  of  Swedish  fathers  used  their  right  to  take  paid  parental  leave  around  that  time 
(average 8 weeks)
2. 
The economics literature on issues related to fathers’ leave taking is scarce, and it is primarily based on 
Swedish and US data. This research is concerned with the effect of individual eligibility on leave 
taking as well as with the consequences on fathers and their children of their leave taking. 
Increased individual eligibility to paid and unpaid parental leave schemes has caused fathers to increase 
their  usage  of  the  leave  schemes.  This  result  has  been  found  both  for  the  relatively  moderate  US 
parental leave schemes (Han, Ruhm and Waldfogel, 2009), where increased eligibility makes fathers 
increase leave taking by 50-80%, and for the more generous Swedish parental leave schemes (Ekberg, 
Eriksson and Friebel, 2005; Eriksson, 2005), where a one-month quota dedicated to the father, makes 
fathers increase leave by 2 weeks on average. The US study bases identification on interstate variation 
over time and the Swedish studies base identification on a regression discontinuity design. Therefore, it 
is  fair  to  interpret  these  studies  as  firm  evidence  that  increased  eligibility  increases  leave  taking. 
However, it is still unclear which role economic incentives play for the fathers’ decisions. 
Regarding the analyses of the effects of child leave on the careers of fathers, Albrecht et al. (1999) and 
Stafford and Sundström (1996) find that the effect of child leave on wages is more detrimental for a 
father’s career than it is for that of a mother. The relationship is identified by panel data methods, and 
the  results  have  been  interpreted  as  indicative  that  leave-taking  signals  a  low  level  of  career 
mindedness among fathers. A similar conclusion is reached by Bygren and Duvander (2006) who find 
that fathers tend to take a shorter leave if their work place is such that high career-related costs may be 
expected. Examples of such workplaces are found in the private sector, in small firms with few female 
employees and few other male employees using the leave schemes. Sociological studies confirm these 
conclusions  (e.g.  Lammi-Taskula,  2007;  Hyde,  Essex  and  Horton,  1993).  When  it  comes  to  the 
analyses of the effects of the fathers’ child leave on the careers of the mothers, Ekberg, Eriksson and 
                                                 
1 The US figures relate to births in 2001, see Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel (2007), while the Danish figures relate to births 
in 2000, see Statistics Denmark (2000) and Figure A1 in this paper. 
2 The Swedish figures relate to the period after the first daddy month reform in 1995, see Ekberg, Eriksson and Friebel 
(2005).   2 
Friebel (2005) and Pylkkänen and Smith (2003) find that the “Daddy month reform” in Sweden in 1995 
meant that mothers returned faster to work after child birth, but this was due to the fact that the total 
amount of child leave available was held constant. Eriksson (2005) finds that the second “Daddy month 
reform” in 2002, which coincided with an increase in the total length of leave from 12 to 13 months, 
increased both the leave taking of the mother and the father. While the mentioned studies tend to find 
negative  effects  on  the  father’s  own  career  from  leave  taking,  the  mentioned  studies  provide  no 
evidence of positive effects on his partner’s career from his leave taking. 
Considering the effects of child leave on male care-taking activities, Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel 
(2007) find evidence that US fathers who take parental leave are more involved in dressing, feeding, 
bathing and getting up at night nine months after birth. The results may to some extent reflect selection 
effects rather than causal effects as identification relies on selection on observables. Looking at long 
run  effects  on  male  care-taking  activities,  Ekberg,  Eriksson  and  Friebel  (2005)  find  no  effect  of 
Swedish father’s leave usage on their involvement in child care and household work when the child is 
eight years old. The authors argue that the results are likely to reflect causal effects as identification is 
based on comparison of fathers with children born slightly before and slightly after the introduction of 
the  “daddy  month”,  which  increased  father’s  leave  by  two  weeks  on  average.  It  is  perhaps  not 
surprising that such a small increase in fathers’ involvement has no long run effects.
3 
In this study, I exploit a reform of the paid leave regulation in Denmark in 2002. This reform affected 
couples differently depending on whether they were employed in the same or in different parts of the 
public  sector.  The  public  sector  consists  of  two  sub-sectors:  a  local  sub-sector  which  comprises 
municipalities and counties (e.g. public child care, compulsory education, health services) and a state 
sub-sector  (e.g.  higher  education,  central  administration).  After  the  reform,  all  publicly  employed 
fathers with partners employed in parts of the public sector different from their own suddenly got a 
strong economic incentive to take a part of the child-leave. No such change affected couples where the 
partners were employed in the same part of the public sector. The extent of the increased economic 
incentive  depended  on  their  wage.  Based  on  a  differences-in-differences  strategy,  I  nail  down  the 
causal effect of economic incentives by estimating how price sensitive the leave-sharing decision is. 
Increasing the couples’ after tax income by $9 per day of leave which is transferred from the mother to 
the father is found to increase fathers’ leave usage by one day. This corresponds to an elasticity of 
almost  unity.  However,  the  effect  tends  to  increase  as  time  passes  by,  and  two  years  after  its 
introduction,  the  same  amount  would  increase  fathers’  leave  usage  one  and  a  half  day.  As  also 
indicated by Olsen (2007), individuals, local municipalities and employers found that the new leave 
scheme was quite complex, and this is most likely the main reason for the increase over time. 
Furthermore, I investigate the effect of the increased intra-household leave sharing on the mother’s and 
the father’s subsequent careers. An increase in leave-sharing is associated with better career outcomes 
for the mother, and worsened career outcomes for the father. However, the mean response to the reform 
is only 2.6 days which is a small number in a career perspective, and it is not evident from the analysis 
that the estimated career effects represent significant causal effects. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the child leave regulations in the public sector in 
Denmark  during  the  relevant  time  period,  and  explains  how  the  reform  of  2002  may  be  used  for 
                                                 
3 Rasmussen (forthcoming) finds that a 10 weeks increase in maternity leave had no effect on long-run child outcomes.   3 
identification.  Section  3  presents  the  data.  Section  4  presents  the  empirical  analysis.  Section  5 
concludes the paper. 
2.  The public sector leave schemes and the reform 
Universal leave schemes have existed in Denmark since 1967, and they have been gradually improved 
in terms of duration and generosity of pay since then. As of today, a parent is individually eligible for 
one year of unpaid leave after child birth, while the couple is jointly eligible for one year of paid leave. 
For births in 2005, a mother used on average 254 days of paid leave (after birth) while a father used on 
average 30 days of paid leave. From 1994 to 2005, the father’s share of the couple’s total leave usage 
has almost constantly been 10%. See figures A1 and A2 in the appendix. 
In this section, the focus is on leave schemes and reforms influencing employees in the public sector 
which in 2005 employed 36% of the total number of employees (53% of the employed women, 22% of 
the employed men).
4 The public sector is at the forefront of defining favorable leave schemes, although 
the same schemes prevail in large parts of the private sector too.
5 
In the first sub-section below, the child leave schemes of the Danish public sector are described. After 
that, the changed interpretation of these schemes due to the flexible child leave reform of 2002 is 
presented. In the final sub-section, the use of this reform for identification is discussed. 
2.1.  Child leave in the Danish public sector 
Since 1985, mothers have had the right to 4 weeks of pregnancy leave before the due date and 14 
weeks of maternity leave after it, whereas fathers have been eligible for 2 weeks of paternity leave after 
birth. On the top of that, a parental leave of 10 weeks to be shared between the parents has existed. 
During  periods  of  leave,  the  minimum  compensation  was  defined  by  the  maximum  rate  of 
unemployment insurance benefits (UI-benefits). Employers of working women who offered a higher 
compensation, received a reimbursement by the local authorities corresponding to the UI-benefits.
6 
From 1989, the collective agreements for the public sector implied full uncapped wage compensation 
during child leave. However, no more than a total of 10 weeks of paid parental leave were available for 
the parents to share regardless of whether one or both of the parents were publicly employed as the 
wage compensation is conditional on reimbursement from the local authorities.
7 
A  number  of  reforms  changed  the  leave  schemes  further.  To  alleviate  problems  with  high 
unemployment, which peaked at 12.3% in 1993, an additional child care leave scheme was introduced 
so as to withdraw workers from the workforce. It allowed for an additional 52 weeks of paid child care 
                                                 
4 See Statistics Denmark (2006) 
5 In the sector of finance, insurance and banking, leave schemes generally copy the public sector, while the national phone 
company (TDC) and the big pharmaceutical companies (such as Novo Nordisk), offer as good or better leave schemes than 
the public sector. 
6 It is only the level of pay that is related to the UI-benefits, eligibility for child leave does not require membership of a UI-
fund. 
7  One  exception  is  the  pregnancy  leave,  where  the  local  municipalities  and  local  counties  assure  full  uncapped  wage 
compensation starting 8 weeks before the due date, while the state guarantees full uncapped wage compensation starting 6 
weeks before the due date, even though the local authorities only reimburse an amount corresponding to UI-benefits 4 
weeks before the due date.   4 
leave  at  a  reduced  compensation  rate  (to  distinguish  this  from  the  other  child  leave  schemes,  this 
scheme is denoted: “the child care leave scheme”).
8 In 1999, two additional weeks of paternity leave 
were introduced to be taken at the end of (typically) the mothers’ parental leave period, that is, in the 
25
th and 26
th week after giving birth. In the public sector, this extra leave period prompted full wage 
compensation. In 2002, a flexible child leave reform abolished child care leave while extending the 
regular leave period with a relatively high compensation rate to a total of 52 weeks. Details about this 
reform follow in the next sub-section. 
2.2.  The flexible child leave reform of 2002 
In  January  2002,  the  draft  legislation  for  a  flexible  child  leave  reform  was  presented.  It  was 
implemented for children born on March 27, 2002, and onwards. Parents of children born January 1, 
2002 – March 26, 2002, could choose to use the old or new child leave scheme depending on their 
preferences. 
The major changes introduced by this reform were the possibilities of simultaneous leave, part-time 
leave as well as a postponed leave period. However, the reform also extended the period with full 
benefit compensation from 4+14+10 weeks to 4+14+32 weeks, meaning that the parental leave to be 
shared between the two parents was extended from 10 to 32 weeks. This extension replaced the 52 
weeks of child care leave (at a low compensation rate) as well as the two additional weeks of paternity 
leave to be taken by the father in weeks 25 and 26 after the birth.
9  
As a consequence of the flexible child leave reform, parents employed in the two different sub-sectors 
of the public sector suddenly got the opportunity of taking 10 weeks of parental leave each with a full 
uncapped wage compensation. The same opportunity was not available for parents employed in the 
same  sub-sector.  These  parents  still  had  to  share  the  10  week  period  with  full  uncapped  wage 
compensation between them. Thus, the attractiveness of leave-sharing and the attractiveness of leave-
taking for fathers, who would most often be the marginal users of child leave, improved substantially. 
It is unclear whether this change in incentives was intentional or not, but this does not matter for the 
present purpose. 
Figure 1 illustrates the regime before and after the flexible child leave reform for couples employed in 
the public sector. Before the reform (top panel), the mother would get 4+14+10 weeks of leave with 
full wage compensation, while the father would only get the 10 weeks of parental leave with full wage 
compensation, if the mother was willing to forego this part of the leave period. In addition to this child 
leave period, either parent could obtain child care leave for 52 weeks at a reduced rate (60% of benefit 
level). After the reform, the situation was basically unchanged if the partners were employed in the 
same part of the public sector (mid panel), except, child care leave at a low compensation rate was 
replaced by an extension of the ordinary child leave scheme at a compensation rate determined by the 
maximum rate of UI-benefits. However, if the parents were employed in different parts of the public 
sector (bottom panel), the attractiveness of the father’s use of the parental leave scheme was improved 
                                                 
8 Until 1996, the compensation rate was 80% of the maximum rate of UI benefits. From 1.1.1996 the compensation rate was 
reduced to 70%, while it was further reduced to 60% of the maximum rate of UI benefits on 1.4.1997, where it stayed until 
the scheme ended in 2002. 
9 In this respect the change is similar to the change in Germany studied by Bergemann and Riphahn (2009). The reform in 
Germany also reduced the length of leave while increasing the compensation rate.   5 
significantly, because he would now receive full uncapped wage compensation for an additional 10 
weeks if the mother were willing to forego this part of the leave period. If she takes it herself, she 
would only get compensated by the rate of UI-benefit. This additional compensation is illustrated by 
gray area at the bottom panel of Figure 1. The economic incentive to let the father take the leave is 
indicated by the size of this gray area. In the sketch in Figure 1, W is twice as large as B, which is 
roughly  correct  for  the  average  father  in  the  sample  to  be  used  in  this  paper.  However,  generally 
speaking the size of the grey area varies, and the size indicates the absolute incentive to let the father 
take part of the parental leave.  
2.3.  Using the reform for identification 
It is inherently difficult to identify the causal effect of economic incentives on leave-taking as the 
variation in economic incentives across individuals most often stems from time changes, interstate 
variation or variation in the sector, education or occupation of the individual. As a consequence the 
effect  of  economic  incentives  on  leave-taking  behavior  would  either  be  indistinguishable  from 
endogenous policy responses or from systematic variation in preferences over time, across states and 
over sector, occupation or education. 
However, the  flexible child leave reform is almost ideal to identify the causal effect of  economic 
incentives on the fathers’ usage of child leave as it allows for an identification strategy which does not 
suffer from these drawbacks. In contrast to, for instance, the Swedish “Daddy month” reforms, it was 
not implemented with the particular purpose of influencing the leave decisions of fathers. Thus, the 
reform is unlikely to represent an endogenous policy response. The effect of the economic incentives 
on a sub-population of fathers can be regarded as an unintended byproduct of the reform affecting 
couples employed in different sectors and not as a result of the changed legislation as such. 
Another important advantage of the policy is that the effect of the reform on economic incentives for 
fathers to take leave varied across otherwise identical individuals. The reform gave fathers in couples 
employed in different parts of the public sector incentives to take more of the parental leave than 
otherwise similar fathers in couples employed in the same sub-sector. Therefore, it gives me a natural 
treatment and control group. This interpretation assumes - quite uncontroversially - that the father is the 
marginal leave user, whose leave decision is affected by the improved economic incentives.
10 Thus, we 
can employ a difference-in-differences approach, where couples in different sub-sectors (Different) are 
treated by improved economic incentives to let the father take part of the parental leave, while couples 
employed in the same sub-sectors are a control group. 
The main identifying assumption is the standard difference-in-differences assumption that the treatment 
group and the control group are affected similarly by common trends in leave-taking behavior. In this 
particular context, the assumption is that other time-varying influences, such as the father’s preference 
for leave-taking, business cycle effects, child care opportunities etc. should evolve identically over time 
for  the  two  groups.  This  assumption  also  implies  that  the  selection  of  couples  into  treatment  is 
unrelated to the change introduced by the reform. This means that the decisions of the couples of 
whether or not to be employed in two different parts of the public sector (local and state) are unrelated 
to the extraordinarily generous leave conditions that the fathers would be eligible for if they were 
                                                 
10 This corresponds to Olsen (2007), which reports that 94% of all mothers use 10 weeks of parental leave, while only 25% 
of the fathers take part of the parental leave after the reform.   6 
covered by different agreements. The identifying assumption is discussed in detail in the empirical 
analysis. 
As it is evident from the above description of the reform, one potential problem with using this reform 
for identification is that the new scheme is relatively complicated. In fact, Olsen (2007) reports that 
parents,  employers  and  local  municipalities  who  administer  the  new  law  found  the  new  scheme 
complicated  to  understand,  and  the  author  recommends  publication  of  easy-to-read  information 
material  about  the  new  leave  scheme.  This  complicates  identification  because  the  couples  in  the 
treatment group may not even be aware of their treatment, and the effects may materialize gradually as 
information about the details of the new scheme is spread. For this reason, the estimated treatment 
effect is the “effect of the intention to treat”. 
3.  Data 
For the empirical analysis, a register-based dataset covering the Danish population 1980-2006 is used. 
The  dataset  contains  socio-demographic  information,  such  as  age,  gender,  education,  income, 
residence, and it is augmented by complete information about fertility and child leave histories. As a 
starting point, all births in the window 1997-2005 are selected, and then the sample is restricted to 
couples for whom data is available in the registers. Further selection criteria are described in detail 
below and summarized in Table 1. 
In order to have exact information on the leave conditions of both parents, and in order to achieve 
identification, I select a sample of couples where the parties are publicly employed. First of all, the 
identification  strategy  is  only  relevant  for  couples  where  the  male  is  eligible  for  full  wage 
compensation if he uses all or part of the 10 weeks of parental leave. And, this is the case for all 
publicly employed fathers. Secondly, the main identifying assumption is that the treatment and the 
control group are influenced by a common trend in leave-taking behavior. The main concern is that the 
fathers’ preferences for leave-taking are likely to increase over time, and the common trend assumption 
implies that this rise is assumed similar in the treatment and the control group. This concern means that 
it is an advantage to choose a relatively homogenous sample where the treated couples are relatively 
similar to the control group. For this reason, only couples where both parties completed a short-cycle, a 
medium-cycle or a long-cycle higher education are selected. However, the fact that they are educated 
also increases the likelihood that the couples understand the complicated flexible leave scheme, and 
thus that they are aware of whether they are treated or not. As a consequence, the main results of the 
empirical  analysis  should  be  interpreted  conditional  on  being  part  of  a  well-educated,  publicly 
employed  couple.  However,  results  for  all  publicly  employed  couples  are  presented  as  well  as  a 
robustness check. 
Finally, I disregard couples whose children were born in the period January 1-March 26, 2002, where 
the opportunity was offered for them to choose which leave scheme to be covered by. I also leave out 
couples where none of the partners are recorded to take child leave as this is unlikely to be true. The 
sample selection process leaves me with 17,680 couples and births.   7 












   
   
Before the reform 
After the reform – same sub-sector 
After the reform – different sub-sectors 
Mother  Father 
Mother  Father 
Mother  Father 
Legend 
  compensation 
potential  compensation  to  the  father  if  the 
mother foregoes leave 
W: wage, B: benefit    8 
Table 1. Overview of the sample selection process 
Original samples sizes
All births 1997-2005 (twins count only once) 604,128
Mother and father can be identified 582,777
Mother and father can be identified and data is available 566,876
Mother and father form a couple at birth 536,967
   of which
      mother and father are aged 20 to 50 years  531,361
      mother and father have completed higher education 103,947
      mother and father are employed in the public sector 34,948
Final sample sizes
All couples aged 20-50 years who are employed in the public sector 33,889
   without births 1.1.02-26.3.02 and births without leave 32,770
All high educated couples aged 20-50 years who are employed in the public sector 18,171
   without births 1.1.02-26.3.02 and births without leave 17,680  
 
For each individual, the total number of leave days is computed. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of 
leave days taken by the mother and the father before and after the reform in 2002.
11 Among the fathers, 
19% and 15% take no leave at all before and after the reform, respectively. Only few fathers use more 
than four weeks of child leave, but this fraction has increased from 13 to 22%. For mothers, the main 
peak is at 23-24 weeks before the reform which corresponds to the period of full wage compensation, 
whereas after the reform there is also a peak at 45-46 weeks, which is the maximum period of paid 
leave. After the reform, many mothers take a longer leave than the period of full wage compensation; 
the fraction of mothers using more than 24 weeks increased from 54% to 83%. 
After the reform, 6.6% of the mothers are recorded to take more leave than what is allowed according 
to the schemes illustrated in Figure 1. In the empirical analysis, they are assumed to take no more than 
46 weeks of leave, which is the maximum period of leave that they are allowed. Part of the reason is 
that some mothers have another child shortly after the child leave in question, which complicates the 
process of attributing leave to the right births. This is partly due to the fact that some mothers carry 
over pre-reform child care leave from earlier births. 
                                                 
11 We disregard the pregnancy leave taken by the mother before the birth. If the couple uses the post-reform flexibility to go 
on part-time leave or extend the maximum leave period while reducing compensation, we compute the number of leave 
days as the corresponding number of full-time leave days.   9 
Figure 2. Number of leave days taken before and after the reform 




















































































































































Weeks  10 
Table 2. Data description 
 
  Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Background characteristics
First child (0/1) 0.47 - 0.45 - 0.47 - 0.45 -
Second child (0/1) 0.42 - 0.44 - 0.42 - 0.44 -
Twin birth (0/1) 0.02 - 0.02 - 0.02 - 0.02 -
Big City (0/1) 0.46 - 0.52 - 0.46 - 0.52 -
City (0/1) 0.30 - 0.28 - 0.30 - 0.28 -
Age 34.6 5.1 34.4 4.7 32.3 3.7 32.5 3.7
Local (0/1) 0.81 - 0.21 - 0.81 - 0.79 -
Post reform (0/1) 0.54 - 0.52 - 0.54 - 0.52 -
Income variables
Labor income (DKK, 2006 prices) 332738 129439 340628 126685 262873 90695 257144 95752
Labor income in year 2006 (DKK) 387311 173126 410090 157883 296155 122796 293894 130504
Log (labor income, 2006 prices) 12.6 0.5 12.6 0.5 12.4 0.5 12.3 0.6
Log (labor income in year 2006) 12.6 1.7 12.7 1.5 12.2 1.9 12.1 2.1
Labor income-Benefit per day - - 469.38 346.79 - - 240.66 262.46
Career variables
Promotion, year 1 after birth (0/1) 0.11 - 0.13 - 0.07 - 0.09 -
Promotion, year 2 after birth (0/1) 0.13 - 0.15 - 0.09 - 0.11 -
Wage increase DKK, year 1 after birth 41524 98055 44588 101423 -26148 92234 -27734 97836
Wage increase DKK, year 2 after birth 61058 110011 63098 112415 31648 92675 30959 100609
Wage increase in pct, year 1 after birth 0.19 0.86 0.20 0.97 -0.09 0.91 -0.09 1.12
Wage increase in pct, year 2 after birth 0.29 1.15 0.34 1.33 0.27 1.51 0.26 1.45
Leave variables
No leave (0/1) 0.15 - 0.22 - 0.01 - 0.02 -
No parental leave (0/1) 0.80 - 0.82 - 0.03 - 0.03 -
Total leave (days) 26.9 30.3 24.0 29.3 226.1 69.0 225.1 70.6
Parental leave (days) 9.89 25.7 8.65 23.9 129.80 64.7 129.2 65.3
Share of total leave (%) 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.89 0.14 0.89 0.15
Education variables
SCHE (0/1) 0.07 - 0.18 - 0.04 - 0.03 -
1: SCHE SocSci (0/1) 0.01 - 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.01 -
2: SCHE NatTech (0/1) 0.02 - 0.04 - 0.01 - 0.02 -
3: SCHE PoliceArmy (0/1) 0.04 - 0.12 - 0.02 - 0.00 -
MCHE (0/1) 0.55 - 0.24 - 0.67 - 0.59 -
4: MCHE PedTeach (0/1) 0.42 - 0.10 - 0.42 - 0.27 -
5: MCHE SocSci (0/1) 0.03 - 0.03 - 0.03 - 0.04 -
6: MCHE NatTech (0/1) 0.04 - 0.10 - 0.01 - 0.02 -
7: MCHE Health (0/1) 0.06 - 0.01 - 0.21 - 0.26 -
LCHE (0/1) 0.38 - 0.59 - 0.28 - 0.38 -
8: LCHE Health (0/1) 0.11 - 0.06 - 0.07 - 0.09 -
9: LCHE SocSci (0/1) 0.11 - 0.20 - 0.09 - 0.12 -
10: LCHE NatTech (0/1) 0.10 - 0.22 - 0.06 - 0.07 -
11: LCHE HumSci (0/1) 0.06 - 0.10 - 0.06 - 0.11 -
Occupation
1: Manager (0/1) 0.02 - 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.00 -
2: High-level salaried (0/1) 0.65 - 0.67 - 0.52 - 0.53 -
3: Low-level salaried (0/1) 0.25 - 0.12 - 0.41 - 0.41 -
4: Skilled (0/1) 0.06 - 0.16 - 0.05 - 0.04 -
5: Unskilled (0/1) 0.00 - 0.01 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
6: Other (0/1) 0.01 - 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.01 -
Number of observations 12692 4988 12692 4988
Same sub-sector
Father Mother
Different sub-sector Same sub-sector Different sub-sector
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In Table 2, summary statistics are presented separately for fathers and mothers in the control group 
(same sub-sector) and the treatment group (different sub-sectors). Couples in the treatment and control 
groups are relatively similar although there are some differences which should be corrected for by 
adding control variables in the empirical analysis. Couples in the treatment group are slightly more 
likely to live in a big city than couples in the control group. Most often it is the fathers in the treatment 
group who are employed in the state whereas the mothers are employed in the local municipality or 
local county. Couples in the control group are more often employed in the local municipality or local 
county. Wages and promotion patterns are slightly better in the treatment group. Fathers in the control 
group tend to take more leave, and they more often have a medium cycle higher education and less 
often a long cycle higher education, which makes sense as teachers and pedagogues constitute a large 
group of public employees in the local municipalities. 
In Figure 3, the trends in leave taking in the control group and the treatment group are illustrated. For 
fathers, the trends in child leave are rather similar before the reform, and the treatment group really 
only takes off two years after the reform (that is in 2004). This is suspected to be due to a delayed 
response to the reform. For mothers, the average leave of the control group increases as a consequence 
of the reform, while for the treatment group it rises and then falls back to a slightly lower level two and 
three years after the reform (that is, in 2004 and 2005), which supports a delayed response as well. 
There are no other main reforms or changes in society in 2004 that could explain this pattern. 
 


























In Table 3, transition matrices for the couples’ transitions between possible combinations of sub-sectors 
are shown. Panels A and C show the transition rates before birth for couples observed to have a child 
pre- and post-reform, respectively, whereas panels B and D show the transition rates after the birth for 
couples observed to have a child pre- and post-reform, respectively.  
It is evident from the table that the transition rates before birth are literally unchanged before and after 
the reform. Thus, there is no evidence that couples select into the treatment group as a consequence of 
the reform. This makes perfect sense as switching from the control group to the treatment group would 
require a switch of job which would most likely be much more costly than the potential gain from the 
child leave scheme. Furthermore, for some individuals it would be difficult to switch group either   12 
because  they  reside  outside  Copenhagen  and  the  biggest  cities,  where  state  employment  is  more 
prevalent, or because the employment possibilities depend on their education. The local municipalities 
are responsible for schools and daycare facilities, and thus they employ the dominant share of teachers 
and pedagogues, while the local counties are responsible for public hospitals and general practitioners 
and thus employ most of the health personnel. 
When it comes to the period after the birth, it is seen in the table that the transition pattern changes 
slightly as an additional 10% of the couples in different sub-sectors transit to the same sub-sectors after 
the reform. It is not a tendency that challenges the main identifying assumption.
12 
 
Table 3. Transition matrices 
A: Pre-reform (before birth)  C: Post-reform (before birth)
Period t-1
Couple is employed in Same Different Other All Nobs Same Different Other All Nobs
Same 0.915 0.029 0.056 1.000 6916 0.944 0.026 0.031 1.000 7276
Different 0.069 0.864 0.068 1.000 2874 0.108 0.855 0.037 1.000 2731
Other combination 0.401 0.171 0.428 1.000 5711 0.416 0.191 0.393 1.000 5149
All 0.569 0.236 0.195 1.000 15501 0.614 0.231 0.155 1.000 15156
  B: Pre-reform (after birth) D: Post-reform (after birth)
Period t-1
Couple is employed in Same Different Other All Nobs Same Different Other All Nobs
Same 0.794 0.025 0.182 1.000 9211 0.807 0.025 0.169 1.000 8242
Different 0.047 0.738 0.215 1.000 3853 0.158 0.620 0.221 1.000 3075
Other combination 0.248 0.114 0.638 1.000 2326 0.265 0.109 0.626 1.000 1115
All 0.524 0.217 0.259 1.000 15390 0.598 0.180 0.223 1.000 12432
Period t
Couple is employed in
Period t
Couple is employed in
Period t
Couple is employed in
Period t
Couple is employed in
 
Note: The pre-reform period is defined as 1997-2001, while the post-reform period is defined as 2002-2005. Each couple contribute with 
several observations. For instance, if the couple have two children in 1998 and 2000, they contribute with three observations to panel A 
(1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/00) and three observations to panel B (1998/99, 1999/00, 2000/01). 
 
In Table 4, couples are distributed by education type-level cells. For each cell, the proportion of treated 
couples is given. The average rate of treatment is 28%, but the proportion varies considerably across 
the cells. For instance, the cell consisting of two pedagogues and teachers (4,4) contains 4,351 couples, 
which is about one fourth of the sample, and these couples are rarely treated. Exactly the same is seen 
for another large group of male pedagogues or teachers (4) combined with female nurses (7). At the 
other extreme, couples consisting of a male with a long cycle higher education in social sciences (9) or 
in natural or technical sciences (10) combined with a female pedagogue, teacher or nurse (4 or 7) are 
treated  more  often  than  average.  This  table  underlines  the  importance  of  controlling  carefully  for 
individuals’, partners’ and couples’ level and type of education. 
                                                 
12 This tendency of couples to transit away from employment in different sub-sectors reflects that more males switch sector 
and that more first time parents switch sector after a birth after the reform compared to before the reform. If the pattern was 
due to the reform, one would have expected the opposite; namely that first time parents have an incentive to stay under 
different agreements until fertility is completed, while second and third time parents have an incentive to switch if they 
expect their fertility to be completed.   13 
Table 4. Proportions of couples employed in different sub-sectors across education cells 
Father's
education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
 
1 0.14 0.33 0.00 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.15 0.42
29 9 2 97 11 2 67 6 15 2 13 253
2 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.20 0.47 0.36 0.24 0.45 0.57 0.43
6 40 1 180 16 10 132 11 25 22 23 466
3 0.29 0.68 0.02 0.82 0.58 0.43 0.88 0.89 0.33 0.40 0.46 0.55
14 34 290 253 19 14 308 18 61 15 13 1039
4 0.22 0.31 0.80 0.05 0.18 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.39 0.45 0.42 0.08
18 32 5 4351 120 30 871 60 137 55 184 5863
5 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.29 0.20 0.33 0.32 0.22 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.29
8 6 1 156 133 3 105 9 32 11 34 498
6 0.22 0.38 0.00 0.56 0.48 0.25 0.57 0.65 0.31 0.37 0.49 0.50
9 26 3 268 33 72 323 46 72 49 55 956
7 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.08 0.10 0.33 0.03 0.19 0.56 0.11 0.32 0.08
3 8 2 146 20 3 557 21 27 9 22 818
8 0.75 0.27 . 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.18 0.45 0.44 0.56 0.19
4 15 0 109 19 8 546 727 106 62 71 1667
9 0.18 0.40 0.00 0.50 0.37 0.60 0.52 0.54 0.29 0.44 0.43 0.41
17 15 2 414 106 25 423 165 854 115 264 2400
10 0.23 0.23 0.38 0.62 0.49 0.35 0.65 0.60 0.37 0.27 0.40 0.45
26 43 8 386 67 51 470 185 247 717 212 2412
11 0.08 0.33 . 0.41 0.53 0.40 0.51 0.47 0.36 0.26 0.34 0.39
12 9 0 296 43 10 192 83 149 50 464 1308
All 0.24 0.36 0.05 0.20 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.40 0.28
146 237 314 6656 587 228 3994 1331 1725 1107 1355 17680
Mother's education
 
Note: Education groups are coded as follows: 1) SCHE SocSci, 2) SCHE NatTech, 3) SCHE PoliceArmy, 4) MCHE PedTeach, 5) MCHE 
SocSci, 6) MCHE NatTech, 7) MCHE Health, 8) LCHE Health, 9) LCHE SocSci, 10) LCHE NatTech, and 11) LCHE HumSci. 
4.  Empirical analysis 
In this subsection, the results of the estimation of the impact of economic incentives on the fathers’ use 
of parental leave are presented as well as the results of the estimation of the consequences of leave-
sharing on the subsequent career of both the father and the mother.   14 
4.1.  Estimating the effect of economic incentives on leave-taking 
As described earlier, a differences-in-differences identification strategy is applied when estimating the 
effect  of  economic  incentives  on  leave-taking.  The  following  equation  is  estimated  separately  for 
fathers and mothers: 
(1)   0 1 2 * ij ij ij ij ij ij ij Leave Post Different Post Different X u a b b b g = + + + + +  
for child j for individual i. The dependent variable Leave indicates the number of leave days, while the 
variable Post indicates  whether the child birth  is observed before or after the reform of the leave 
scheme, Different indicates whether the parents are employed in different sub-sectors of the public 
sector or in the same sub-sectors. The parameter of main interest is the coefficient to the interaction 
term between Post and Different, 2 b . This parameter captures the effect of being treated with improved 
economic  incentives  inducing  the  father  to  take  leave.  Equation  (1)  is  estimated  by  ordinary  least 
squares (OLS) using total leave of either parent as a dependent variable. Furthermore, equation (1) is 
estimated  by  a  tobit  specification  using  parental  leave  as  a  dependent  variable,  while  applying 
appropriate lower and upper limits to account for censoring and to capture the effects of treatment at 
the relevant leave margins. For fathers, a lower limit (LL) of 0 days/0 weeks is applied and an upper 
limit (UL) of 224 days/32 weeks is chosen to resemble the idea that the father is the marginal leave 
user. The estimation results are reported as marginal effects on expected leave, which counts both the 
effect on the latent leave demand and on the probability of entering the range of leave between LL and 
UL. In the tobit regression for mothers, a lower limit of 70 days/10 weeks and an upper limit of 224 
days/32 weeks are applied.
13 
After  the  reform,  both  parents  were  eligible  for  10  weeks  of  paid  parental  leave  at  full  wage 
compensation if they were in the treatment group, while only one of the parents could use the right to 
10 weeks paid parental leave at full wage compensation if the couple was in the control group, and that 
parent would almost always be the mother. This is exactly what is picked up by the interaction term 
Post*Diff. The amount of extra treatment measured in DKK is calculated as the father’s labor income 
per day at child birth minus the daily benefit rate, this amount is denoted the CompGain, and as shown 
in Table 2, the average amount in the treatment group is DKK 469 ($67). In some specifications, we 
include Post*CompGain instead of the cross term effect (Post*Different), and furthermore, we also try 
to include the crude benefit-wage ratio, CompRate, instead of the cross term effect (Post*Different). 
The vector of control variables, Xij, includes year dummies (corresponding to Post), indicator variables 
for whether the child is the first, second or third or more, and indicator variables for whether the couple 
lives in a big city or not. Furthermore, the following variables for both partners are included: age, age 
squared,  log  wages  (in  2006  prices),  detailed  indicators  for  the  level  and/or  type  of  education, 
occupation.  As  an  alternative  to  the  education and  occupation  variables,  fixed  effects  for  couples’ 
educational type-level cell indicators are included to account as precisely as possible for the pattern 
revealed in Table 4. 
                                                 
13  Notice  that  these  lower  and  upper  limits  closely  correspond  to  the  peaks  seen  in  Figure  2.  For  fathers,  the  tobit 
specification treats the leave period as censored at 4 weeks of leave, for mothers, the tobit specification treats the leave 
period as censored at 24 weeks of leave.   15 
It is important to notice that the results should be interpreted conditional on being part of a well-
educated, publicly employed couple. The estimate of  2 b  may be seen as an upper bound on the effect 
of economic incentives on the father’s usage of parental leave, because the sample is a selected sample 
of fathers who are in well-educated, publicly employed couples. First of all, public employers are most 
likely more supportive of fathers using the child leave scheme than the private employers (see Bygren 
and Duvander, 2006). In addition, well-educated couples are likely to have more equal gender role 
patterns than other couples, and well-educated and publicly employed fathers are likely to have higher 
preferences for child leave than other fathers (see Stafford and Sundström, 1996). In a US study, Han, 
Ruhm and Waldfogel (2009) find that well-educated fathers are more likely to respond to changes in 
their  leave  policy.  Furthermore,  it  is  expected  that  well-educated  couples  are  more  likely  to  be 
informed of the changes. However, it is still only the “effect of the intention to treat”, as not all couples 
and their employers may be aware of the treatment. 
In the appendix, the full sets of coefficient estimates from estimation of equation (1) for fathers and 
mothers are presented. They generally confirm the expectations. Both fathers and mothers take more 
leave after the reform. Fathers and mothers in local municipalities and counties take more leave than 
otherwise similar individuals employed in the state. The duration of leave increases by age up to a 
point. The duration of leave for the father is highest for the first child, and it is higher for the second 
child than for the third and higher ranked children, while the pattern is the other way around for the 
mother. Both mothers and fathers use more leave in relation to a twin birth. 
The duration of leave is longer for fathers and mothers with a medium cycle higher education than it is 
for those with a short cycle higher education (the reference group), which is again higher than it is for 
those with a long cycle higher education. Own log wages have significant effects on leave-taking, but 
the sign is negative in the tobit specification. Below the focus is on the parameter of main interest, 
which is discussed in detail. 
In Table 5, the result of the estimation of equation (1) for fathers and mothers is presented. With no 
controls (column 1), the effect of interest is 2.6 meaning that fathers in the treatment group increased 
their child leave by 2.6 days (from an average of 9.5 days) after being exposed to increased economic 
compensation for leave taking. Mothers reduce their leave taking correspondingly. This effect goes 
down to 2.2 when control variables are included in the estimation. It  makes no difference for the 
parameter of main interest which of the descriptions of the skill match of the couple is used in columns 
2-5, although when education cell * year fixed effects are added in column 6, the estimates become 
more imprecise. Thus, it is concluded that the indicator for being employed in different sub-sectors 
does not only reflect the couple’s specific educational match. If that was the case, it would question the 
validity of the common trend assumption as preferences for leave are likely to vary with the couples’ 
specific educational match. 
To investigate a potential delayed response, the effect of Different*Post is estimated separately for the 
years  2002-3  and  2004-5,  see  Table  A2.  The  point  estimate  of  the  effect  of  improved  economic 
incentives is higher for fathers in 2004-5 (3.5) compared to the benchmark case (2.6), while the point 
estimate in 2002-3 is not significantly different from zero. This indicates that the effect increases as the 
couples and the employers get to know the reform, and as a consequence, the true effect of economic 
incentives is most likely closer to the long-run response than to the benchmark estimate. 
   16 
Table 5. Estimation of the effect of economic incentives on fathers’ and mothers’ leave taking 




Post*Different 2.324 0.999 2.022 0.989 2.046 0.986 1.995 0.986 2.152 0.990 2.168 1.188
Mothers  




Post*Different 2.591 0.881 2.196 0.858 2.125 0.851 2.114 0.851 2.216 0.857
Mothers
Post*Different -2.971 0.791 -2.342 0.810 -2.416 0.812 -2.312 0.813 -2.448 0.810
   
Controls
Different, Year dummies
Children, local and bigcity 
Own and partner's age and log wages
Own and partner's level of education
Own and partner's type-level of education
Own and partner's occupation
Couple's type-level education cell




















































LL=70 days/10wks, UL=224 days/32 wks




Note: Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level, while italics indicate significance at a 10%-level. N.a. indicates that the Tobit estimates are not available in this case 
as neither the fixed effects nor dummy variable model are estimable.   17 
Running the same regressions with the father’s share of the couple’s leave and the mother’s share of 
the couple’s leave suggest that the treatment induced couples to transfer 1 percent of the leave period 
from the mother to the father.
14 
Inference in a difference-in-differences specification like this should account for clustering. Donald and 
Lang  (2007)  examine  inference  in  difference-in-difference  analysis  and  suggest  that  one  draws 
inference on confidence bands based on t statistics with fewer degrees of freedom which accounts for 
the clustering problem. In the present case, we have six degrees of freedom in the baseline specification 
in column (1) corresponding to a t-statistic of 2.447 at a 5%-level and 1.943 at a 10%-level. This would 
render the OLS estimates insignificant at a 5%-level (but significant at the 10%-level), while the tobit 
estimates would still be significant at the 5% level. Vikström (2009) suggests a sensitivity analysis 
which analyzes whether inference is sensitive to the variance of the cluster effects. Conclusions are 
unchanged if one allows for a cluster variance corresponding to what is seen in the raw data. 
In Table A3 in the appendix, the results for the sample of all public employees are shown. This sample 
includes both the 17,680 highly educated couples from the previous analysis as well as the individuals 
who completed only lower or upper secondary school. For this sample, the fathers respond less to 
economic  incentives,  and  the  effect  is  only  significant  in  the  tobit  model  and  not  in  the  OLS 
estimations. In the tobit model, the fathers increase their leave period by 1.2 days (from an average of 
8.4)  as  a  response  to  the  improved  economic  incentives.  The  mother’s  reduction  in  leave  due  to 
improved economic incentives to let the father take the leave is of the same magnitude, but it is not 
statistically significant. Focusing on the long run response (column 4), the effects are similar in the 
OLS and the tobit model, and the fathers respond by a 2.5 day increase and the mothers respond by a 
similar reduction which is now borderline significant (p-value slightly over 10%). Thus the fathers take 
more leave due to improved economic incentives, but the response of the mothers is not as precisely 
estimated as for the well-educated sample. However, the point estimates indicates that the economic 
incentives induced a transfer of leave from the father to the mother of about 2.5 days in the long run. 
The next step is to reinterpret the finding of a strong effect of economic incentives into more policy 
relevant  figures,  that  is,  money  equivalents  and  elasticities.  In  Figure  4,  the  distribution  of  the 
compensation gains for the 2590 treated fathers who are observed post reform is illustrated. The mean 
gain is DKK 480 (347) while it reaches DKK 496 (315) if the negative values are replaced by zeros.  
                                                 
14 If the share of total leave is used as the dependent variable, this number is .8 percent, while it is 1.2 percent if the share of 
parental leave is used as the dependent variable.   18 
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In columns (1) and (2) in Table 6, the Post*CompGain as well as a quadratic term are included instead 
of  Post*Diff  to  obtain  a  parameter  measured  in  money  terms.  The  resulting  quadratic  profile  is 
illustrated in Figure 5. At the mean gain of DKK 496 per day ($71), leave usage is increased by 2.8 
days, meaning that the father increases leave taking by one day when compensation is improved by 
DKK 175 per day ($25). If we deduct taxes, a transfer of one day from the father to the mother may be 
achieved by increasing net compensation by DKK 65 ($9). The elasticity of child care supply is thus as 
high as .94 using the net compensation,
15 and the effect of economic incentives inducing the fathers to 
take leave is extremely high. 
For the sample of all public employees, the response is somewhat lower. A 400 DKK ($57) increase in 
gross compensation gain corresponding to a DKK 148 ($21) increase in net gain is needed to increase 
leave usage by one day. This results in an elasticity of .44 using net compensation, which is still a high 
number though. 
In columns (2) and (3), a crude measure of the benefit-wage ratio (CompRate) is included instead of 
Post*Diff to interpret the magnitude of the effect of economic incentives. The effect of an increase in 
the benefit-wage ratio by ten percentage points is estimated to be around 2 days, and it is very precisely 
estimated. 
                                                 
15 The elasticity is computed as (2.82/9.54) / ((1-.63)*496/((1-.4)*972))=.94, where 9.54 is the average duration of parental 
leave, DKK 496 is the average compensation gain per day, DKK 972 is the average labor income per day, while .63 and .40 
are the marginal and average tax rates in the relevant tax bracket.   19 
Table 6. Estimation of the effect of economic incentives on fathers’ usage of parental leave 
Explanatory variables Marg.eff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err.
 
Post*CompGain (/100) 1.024 0.250 1.009 0.249
Post*CompGainSqr (/10000) -0.092 -0.024 -0.094 -0.024
CompRate 20.617 1.916 18.541 1.920
Controls
Different, Year dummies
Children, local and bigcity 
Own and partner's age and log wages
Own and partner's level of education










yes yes yes yes
no yes no yes
yes no no
Tobit (Dep.var.=parental leave)
LL=0 days/0wks, UL=224 days/32 wks
17680 17680 17680 17680  
Note: Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level, while italics indicate significance at a 10%-level.  
 














4.2.  Heterogeneous treatment effects
16 
In this sub-section, results from separate estimations by sub-groups are summarized. The effects vary 
widely, and it seems that couples where the mother is relatively career-minded and the father is less 
career-minded apparently respond more to economic incentives than others. Details follow below. 
                                                 
16 Estimation results by sub-group are available from the author upon request.   20 
The effect of economic incentives inducing couples to shift leave from the mother to the father is 
largest for partners in couples with a medium cycle higher education, and it is particularly large if the 
father’s  field  of  education  is  social  sciences,  or  if  the  mother  is  in  the  group  of  teachers  and 
pedagogues. The effects are also significant for partners who have a long cycle higher education within 
social sciences. Focusing on the rank of the child, the effect of economic incentives inducing the couple 
to transfer leave from the mother to the father tends to be larger for the first child than for following 
children. 
The changes in leave usage as a consequence of inducing the father to take leave are larger for mothers 
who are occupied in high-level salaried jobs, and for fathers who are occupied in low-level salaried job. 
Furthermore, the effects tend to be driven by couples living in big cities and by couples where the 
father is employed by the local government while the mother is employed by the state rather than the 
opposite. 
4.3.  Validity checks 
The main methodological concern is whether the common trend assumption is valid. This assumption 
is not testable, but a number of checks can be implemented to ascertain that it holds. 
One concern is that couples employed in different sub-sectors of the public sector are systematically 
different from those employed in the same sub-sector in terms of preferences for fathers to take part of 
the leave. To account for this, detailed controls for the individual’s and the partner’s education and the 
couple’s  combination  of  educations  have  been  included  as  these  variables  are  thought  to  pick  up 
variation in leave preferences across individuals and couples. Furthermore, education cell * year fixed 
effects have been included. As discussed in the previous sub-sections, the results are robust to the 
inclusion of such variables. 
An often used approach to test the common trend assumption is to introduce a “fake reform”. Based on 
the implementation of a fake reform in year 2000, it is found that the coefficient to the parameter of 
interest becomes insignificant when estimating equation (1) based on pre-reform data; see Table A4 in 
the appendix. This indicates that the parameter of main interest does not just pick up the effect of a 
difference in pre-existing trends in child leave. 
Another concern is that couples employed in different sub-sectors to some extent have coordinated 
their choice of employers because they would like to make use of the generous leave conditions for 
fathers. Below, this concern is dismissed by use of a few estimation checks. 
First of all, it is unlikely that the couples are aware of the extraordinarily generous leave conditions for 
fathers until they have been exposed to the child leave regulations themselves. Therefore, the fact that 
couples are more responsive to the reform when they have their first child than when they have further 
children supports the assumption that the effect is not a consequence of self-selection into treatment. 
As a second test of the identifying assumption, the indicator for whether the couple is employed in 
different versus same sub-sector is defined based on the employment relationship in 2001 (that is, 
before the reform). This indicator variable is highly correlated with the actual treatment, but it cannot 
be influenced by “selection into treatment”.
17 In these estimations, the parameter of main interest is 
                                                 
17 This argument to avoid selection into treatment was also applied by Currie and Moretti (2003) and Black et al. (2005).   21 
also statistically significant in the tobit specification (results not reported). However, as expected, these 
results are noisier because the distinction between the treatment and the control group becomes less 
precise. 
4.4.  Estimating the effect of leave-taking on career outcomes 
In  this  sub-section,  it  is  analyzed  whether  leave  taking  has  an  impact  on  post-birth  earnings  and 
promotion. Table 7 shows the results of the estimation of the effect of leave on career outcomes. From 
OLS and probit regressions, it is seen that the association between leave and career outcome is strong 
and negative in particular for mothers. However, these estimates are most likely flawed by endogeneity 
bias as the parents who take a long leave may be systematically less likely to have a large earnings 
potential and a high degree of career commitment. When the potentially endogenous effect of leave on 
career outcome is instrumented, the effects are not as clear. 
 
Table 7. Estimation of the effect of child leave on career outcomes 
  Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err.
Outcome variable:
 
Father Parental leave (days)
OLS/Probit -635.4 28.4 -203.8 35.3 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0005
IV (Post*couples type-level education cell) -554.3 212.4 112.8 276.0 0.0014 0.0038 0.0038 0.0042 -0.0016 0.0039
Number of observations
Mother Total leave (days)
OLS/Probit -447.8 10.3 -115.1 11.8 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0002
IV (Post*couples type-level education cell) -775.0 124.5 -155.1 139.1 -0.0037 0.0011 -0.0036 0.0010 0.0028 0.0029
Number of observations
Controls
Age, children, local, bigcity, year dummies
Occuption and type-level of education
17519 14751 17576 14802
       
Ln wage in 2006
yes yes yes yes yes
17543 14470 17592 14813





Note: Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level, while italics indicate significance at a 10%-level. 
 
The variable Post*Different is not quite strong enough to work well as an instrumental variable. Instead 
indicator variables for the couples’ type-level education cells are used as instrumental variables. Thus, 
the variation in Different visible in Table 4 is used for instrumentation of leave taking. This approach 
indicates a weak or non-existing causal impact of leave on the father’s wages and promotion, while it 
indicates a negative impact of leave on the mother’s wages and promotion. The reason for this gender 
difference is most likely the fact that the father’s leave period is very short on average, while the 
mother’s leave period is substantively longer and therefore makes it easier to detect a potential negative 
impact. For mothers, a one day increase in leave results in a DKK 775 lower increase in annual wages 
in the first year after birth, and a DKK 155 lower increase in annual wages two years after. This pattern 
is consistent with experience foregone during child leave and subsequent catch up. A similar wage 
pattern  is  seen  for  fathers.  For  mothers,  an  increase  in  leave  depresses  the  promotion  probability, 
whereas no effect is found for fathers.   22 
5.  Conclusion 
During the last couple of decades, several OECD countries have tried to induce more fathers to take 
longer  parental  leave  by  reserving  some  weeks  of  leave  for  the  fathers  or  by  improving  their 
compensation rate (OECD, 2007). However, the take-up rate is relatively low and the fathers’ share of 
the  total  leave  is  relatively  low  even  in  the  Nordic  countries  where  some  of  the  most  generous 
conditions are seen. In the Nordic countries the fathers’ share of the total leave ranges from 31% in 
Iceland to around 15% in Sweden and Norway to 5% in Finland (Datta Gupta, Smith and Verner, 
2008). In this study, the proportion for Denmark is found to be around 10%. 
This paper investigates the importance of economic incentives for publicly employed fathers’ usage of 
parental leave schemes. An extensive reform of child leave schemes in Denmark in 2002 affected 
publicly  employed  couples  differently  depending  on  which  combination  of  sub-sectors  they  were 
employed  in.  Based  on  a  differences-in-differences  strategy,  I  find  that  economic  incentives  are 
extremely important for the fathers’ usage of parental leave schemes. The average couple in the sample 
transferred  2.6  days  from  the  father  to  the  mother  as  a  consequence  of  the  improved  economic 
incentives to let the father use the leave. In money terms, this means that increasing the couples’ after 
tax income by $9 per day of leave which is transferred from the mother to the father is found to 
increase the fathers’ leave usage by one day. This corresponds to an elasticity of almost unity. 
Judging from the results of this paper, which, admittedly, are based on publicly employed couples, the 
most promising strategy to increase fathers’ leave usage would be to increase individual entitlement to 
paid leave in order to incentivize fathers to take leave independently of the mother’s decision. This is 
exactly what OECD (2007) recommends. A fully individualized system is implemented in Iceland, 
where the total statutory paid leave is 9 months – 3 months exclusively for the mother, 3 months 
exclusively to the father and 3 months to be shared between the parents. To a lesser extent, with a 
lower weight on the father’s part of the leave, this is implemented in Sweden and Norway. In Denmark, 
the development goes in the same direction. The state guarantees paid leave for 52 weeks compensated 
at the UI-benefit level – 18 weeks exclusively to the mother, 2 weeks exclusively to the father and 32 
weeks to be shared between the parents. However, the collective agreements increasingly incorporates 
individual entitlement to full uncapped wage compensation during parental leave periods, which means 
that the father independently of the mother gets the right to full pay for a certain part of the parental 
leave. These new agreements give the couple a stronger economic incentive to share the leave between 
them. Given that the aim is to get more fathers to take part of the parental leave, this study is supportive 
of  the  changes  of  the  collective  agreements  in  direction  of  an  extension  of  the  father’s  individual 
entitlement.
18 However, it gives no answer as to whether these types of policies are welfare improving 
from the point of view of society or not. 
 
                                                 
18 However, it is not advisable that the collective agreements extend rights to periods of paid leave to be shared between the 
parents. Such rights should relate to eligibility and not to compensation. These periods would most often be used by the 
mother, and furthermore, it results in discrimination against couples with the same employer without serving a well-defined 
political, economical or financial purpose.   23 
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Appendix 1.  Supplementary empirical evidence 
 
Figure A1. Average child leave during 1994-2005 

















Figure A2. Leave-sharing during 1994-2005 
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Table A1. Estimation of the effect of economic incentives on parents’ leave taking (OLS and 
tobit) 
 
Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err.
 
Post*Different 2.022 0.989 -4.890 2.094 2.196 0.858 -2.241 0.809
Couple characteristics
Different -1.473 0.795 4.857 1.562 -1.445 0.651 2.328 0.646
Local 2.897 0.612 14.234 1.414 1.690 0.469 1.508 0.559
First child 4.551 0.795 -3.992 1.689 3.759 0.664 -1.618 0.650
Second child 1.531 0.760 -2.394 1.610 1.063 0.640 -1.460 0.616
Twin birth 3.322 1.475 4.308 3.108 2.950 1.202 2.726 1.241
Bigcity 2.486 0.464 6.374 0.986 2.330 0.373 2.936 0.386
Own characteristics
Age/10 6.902 5.802 97.251 19.046 6.845 4.695 35.658 7.552
AgeSqr/100 -1.185 0.781 -13.881 2.814 -1.064 0.634 -5.091 1.117
Long cycle higher edu -5.655 0.869 -20.078 2.746 -1.973 0.728 -6.171 1.070
Medium cycle higher edu 1.477 0.879 5.112 2.735 2.837 0.737 3.069 1.082
Ln wage 1.606 0.483 7.877 0.885 -1.536 0.381 -1.707 0.352
Partner's characteristics
Age/10 -7.720 8.964 -4.035 12.244 -4.429 7.196 0.787 4.809
AgeSqr/100 1.162 1.325 0.365 1.648 0.603 1.066 -0.131 0.648
Long cycle higher edu 6.291 1.298 7.085 1.833 6.147 1.165 3.240 0.723
Medium cycle higher edu -2.687 1.248 2.813 1.811 -1.575 1.061 1.304 0.711
Ln wage -0.016 0.418 -0.001 1.022 -0.071 0.322 0.290 0.402
Year dummies
Year 1998 1.528 1.036 0.109 2.195 4.691 0.911 0.840 0.922
Year 1999 5.195 1.034 1.760 2.189 -3.270 0.814 2.107 0.924
Year 2000 6.136 1.037 3.071 2.196 -2.658 0.821 2.497 0.927
Year 2001 6.765 1.033 3.347 2.187 -2.510 0.821 3.260 0.927
Year 2002 8.334 1.054 53.630 2.234 2.099 0.888 25.460 0.984
Year 2003 8.494 0.996 56.999 2.110 1.451 0.828 26.409 0.934
Year 2004 10.818 0.987 54.891 2.092 3.702 0.852 25.696 0.927
Year 2005 10.747 0.977 56.973 2.066 4.143 0.848 26.507 0.914




LL=0 days/0 wks LL=70 days/10 wks
Dep.var.=parental leave Dep.var.=total leave
Fathers Mothers
17680 17680 17680 17680
UL=224 days/32 wks UL=224 days/32 wks
 
Note: Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level, while italics indicate significance at a 10%-level.   27 
Table A2. Estimation of the effect of economic incentives on father’s and mother’s leave taking. 
Delayed response 




Year 2002-2003*Different -0.762 1.244 -1.042 1.528
Year 2004-2005*Different 4.287 1.164 4.422 1.366
Mothers
Post*Different -4.890 2.094
Year 2002-2003*Different -2.220 2.634 -1.335 3.236
Year 2004-2005*Different -7.066 2.466 -6.458 2.893
Fathers
Post*Different 2.591 0.881
Year 2002-2003*Different 0.456 1.045
Year 2004-2005*Different 3.497 1.017
Mothers
Post*Different -2.971 0.791
Year 2002-2003*Different -1.527 1.009




Children, local and bigcity 
Own and partner's age and log wages
Own and partner's level of education









LL=0 days/0wks, UL=224 days/32 wks










Note: Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level, while italics indicate significance at a 10%-level. N.a. indicates that the Tobit 
estimates are not available in this case as neither the fixed effects or dummy variable model are estimable.   28 
Table A3. Estimation of the effect of economic incentives on father’s and mother’s leave-taking. 
All public employees 
Explanatory variables Marg.eff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err.
 
 
Fathers        
Post*Different 1.016 0.692 0.740 0.685 0.819 0.684
Year 2002-2003*Different -1.199 0.861
Year 2004-2005*Different 2.559 0.840
Mothers  
Post*Different -2.459 1.603 -1.405 1.569 -1.460 1.566
Year 2002-2003*Different 0.313 1.970
Year 2004-2005*Different -3.005 1.924
 
Fathers
Post*Different 1.599 0.616 1.201 0.601 1.238 0.598
Year 2002-2003*Different -0.343 0.738
Year 2004-2005*Different 2.512 0.737
Mothers
Post*Different -1.027 0.544 -0.557 0.554 -1.996 1.961
Year 2002-2003*Different -0.068 1.288
Year 2004-2005*Different -1.987 1.260
Controls  
Different, Year dummies
Children, local and bigcity 
Own and partner's age and log wages
Own and partner's level of education




LL=0 days/0wks, UL=224 days/32 wks
LL=70 days/10wks, UL=224 days/32 wks
32770 32770 32770 32770
no no yes no
no yes yes yes
no yes yes yes
no yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes
   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
  
Note: Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level, while italics indicate significance at a 10%-level. 
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Table A4. Estimation of the effect of economic incentives on father’s and mother’s leave taking. 
Fake reform 
Explanatory variables Marg.eff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err. Marg.eff. Std.err.
Fathers
Post fake reform*Different 2.022 0.989 0.662 1.224 1.187 1.493
Mothers
Post fake reform*Different -4.890 2.094 -4.320 2.947 -6.396 3.575
Fathers
Post fake reform*Different 2.591 0.881 -0.011 1.140
Mothers




Children, local and bigcity 
Own and partner's age and log wages
Own and partner's level of education





LL=70 days/10wks, UL=224 days/32 wks


















Note: Bold letters indicate significance at a 5%-level, while italics indicate significance at a 10%-level. N.a. indicates that the Tobit 
estimates are not available in this case as neither the fixed effects or dummy variable model are estimable. 
 